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The Honorable Sven Erik Holmes*
Welcome to the sixth annual review of the most recent term of the Supreme
Court here at the University of Tulsa College of Law. This is also my sixth
introduction.
As most of you know, this program was initially developed by the late
Professor Bernard Schwartz.1 Professor Schwartz established the standard of
excellence by which our work in the area of constitutional law will be measured.
I
The 1999 Term of the Supreme Court addressed a wide spectrum of social,
political, and legal issues. The opinions will forever define the contours of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's legacy. In case after case, the majority solidified and extended
the distinctively conservative jurisprudence that is the signature of the Rehnquist
Court.
The centerpiece of the Rehnquist Court's work has been in the area of
federalism-limiting the authority of Congress, narrowly construing the power
delegated to the federal government, and expanding states' sovereign immunity.
As part of its effort to restrict the scope of the power of Congress, the Court has
struck down all or part of twenty-four federal statutes since 1994. This trend
* United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
1. Bernard Schwartz was the Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa
College of Law from 1992 until his untimely death in 1998. He was a member of the New York
University Law School faculty from 1947-1992. Professor Schwartz authored over 60 books and was
recognized throughout the world as a preeminent constitutional scholar.
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continued in the 1999 Term, as the Court invalidated laws that held states liable
for age discrimination, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,2 allowed women to sue
their abusers in federal court, United States v. Morrison,3 and altered the
requirement that criminal suspects be given Miranda4 warnings, United States v.
Dickerson.5
II
Before turning to specific cases, a brief review of the statistics is instructive:
1. In the 1999 Term, the Court issued seventy-four rulings. This is the lowest
number of cases decided in nearly five decades. As a result, the five-year average
has dropped to approximately seventy-nine cases per term. In the future, we can
anticipate that the Court will decide approximately this number of cases each
year. By now, however, it should be clear that the number of cases does not in any
way reflect the significance of the rulings or the sweeping reach of the Court's
work.
2. A majority of the cases decided this term, 58%, reversed the decision of a lower
court. This fact, however, has no substantive significance. In the event of a split in
the circuits, the Supreme Court generally prefers to decide the case that will
reverse the court of appeals because, in so doing, there can be no future argument
that circuit court dicta also was affirmed. Simply, the Court speaks with greater
clarity for the future when it rejects, rather than affirms, the reasoning and
conclusion of a lower court opinion.
3. The philosophical divisions on the Court were more evident during the 1999
Term. The Court split 5-4 in twenty cases, up from sixteen during the 1998 Term.
These 5-4 splits included some of the Term's most high-profile decisions: FDA v.
Brown & Williamson,6 holding that the Food and Drug Administration did not
have the legal authority to regulate tobacco; Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,7
holding that the Boy Scouts may exclude a gay scoutmaster; United States v.
Morrison,8 holding the Violence Against Women Act to be unconstitutional as
beyond the legal authority of Congress to enact; and Stenberg v. Carhart,9
overturning Nebraska's prohibition of so-called "partial birth abortions."
Notably, the number of unanimous decisions has steadily declined over the past
three years, from 48% in the 1997 Term, to 44% in 1998, to just 39% in 1999.
Moreover, in the close cases, the conservative wing of the Court was clearly
dominant. A review of the 5-4 splits reflects that in 13 such cases, the majority
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. The Court's so-called "liberal" wing-Justices Stevens, Souter,
2. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
3. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Souter, Breyer, J.., dissenting).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Harlan, Stewart, White, J.J., dissenting).
5. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (Stevens, Souter, J.J., dissenting).
8. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
9. 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, J.J., dissenting).
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Ginsburg, and Breyer-prevailed as a group in only one of the 20 splits, Stenberg °
(which was written by Justice O'Connor).
4. The numbers also tell a story about where the Court has been and where it
is going. In 1999-2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed most often with Justice
O'Connor (93% of the time) and agreed least often with Justice Stevens (54% of
the time). This reflects the alliances and conflicts of the last generation. Looking
to the future, it is noteworthy that Justice Breyer agreed most often with Justice
Souter (84% of the time) and agreed least often with Justice Thomas (58% of the
time); Justice Ginsburg agreed most often with Justice Souter (91% of the time)
and agreed least often with Justice Scalia (46% of the time); and Justice Thomas
agreed most often with Justice Scalia (90% of the time) and agreed least often
with Justice Ginsburg (53% of the time). This indicates who may be the primary
combatants in the debates of the next generation.
III
Following the Supreme Court's adjournment in June, many commentators
reported that the 1999 Term was a "mixed bag," that is, that there were a number
of so-called "liberal" results to counterbalance its "conservative" opinions, and
therefore no ideological stamp could be placed on the Court's work. A close
reading of the cases, however, does not support this conclusion. The claim of
moderation is based primarily on four highly-publicized decisions: United States v.
Dickerson," upholding Miranda;12 Hill v. Colorado,'3 upholding state regulation of
abortion clinic protests; Stenberg v. Carhart,14 overturning a state ban on partial
birth abortions; and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,'5 prohibiting
student-led prayer before Texas high school football games. A careful analysis of
these opinions reveals that the law was not changed in any way with respect to the
Fifth Amendment, abortion, or school prayer. In fact, it can be argued that these
either solidified the previously announced Rehnquist Court doctrine or simply
maintained the status quo.
A
In United States v. Dickerson,6 the Court held that the U.S. Congress could
not statutorily modify Miranda v. Arizona.7 Two years after Miranda, Congress
had enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which effectively makes the admissibility of
statements by suspects during interrogation turn solely on whether such
10. Id.
11. 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
14. 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
15. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
16. 120 S. Ct. 2326,2328 (2000).
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2000]
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statements were made "voluntarily." 18 Thus, under the statute, a defendant may
not defend solely on the basis of having not received his "Miranda warnings." The
statute lay dormant for some thirty years, until the Fourth Circuit invoked its
terms to reject a Miranda claim in 1999, holding that the federal law, not Miranda,
was controlling authority. 19
By a 7-2 vote, the Dickerson Court rejected § 3501. In so doing, the Court
followed the unremarkable principle that Congress by statute may not overturn a
"constitutional rule."20 The opinion expressly relies on City of Boerne v. Flores,21
which established the Rehnquist Court framework for determining whether
Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting legislation.
Notably, the "constitutional rule" announced in Miranda was the result of a
painstaking analysis by Chief Justice Warren, balancing society's need for
effective law enforcement with its need to protect individual rights. By contrast,
Dickerson belittles the constitutional element of Miranda, summarily stating,
without analysis, that "experience suggests that the totality of the circumstances
test which § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law
enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent
manner.' '" Moreover, the opinion ignores altogether the exhaustive effort of the
Warren Court to address the competing policy concerns at issue. Rather, the
Court intimates that the substantive holding of Miranda is questionable, stating
that "[w]hether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting
rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare
decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now. '
' 3
B
Likewise, the two abortion cases decided this Term had virtually no effect on
the substantive law. In Hill v. Colorado,24 a 6-3 majority upheld a statute that
regulated speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance of a health care
facility, by prohibiting anyone from "knowingly" approaching within eight feet of
another person without consent and engaging in advocacy. This opinion, however,
provided nothing new to either abortion or First Amendment jurisprudence. The
time, place, and manner restrictions at issue were analyzed entirely under
established principles previously applied to such public advocacy, specifically
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 25 Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New
York,' and Madsen v. Women's Health Center."
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
19. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2328.
20. Id. at 2337.
21. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22. 120 S. Ct. at 2337.
23. Id. at 2336 (emphasis in original).
24. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
25. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
26. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
27. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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Invoking these precedents, the Court upheld the conclusions of various
Colorado appellate courts, all of which had relied on the same authorities. In so
doing, the Court reaffirmed the declaration in Ward that "[t]he principal inquiry
in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place or
manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." The Court further
cited Madsen for the proposition that "[t]he First Amendment does not demand
that patients of a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the
cacophony of political protests., 29 Thus, the opinion did little more than recite
existing law.
In Stenberg v. Carhart, a 5-4 majority ruled that Nebraska could not ban a
"partial birth abortion., 30 The reasoning on all sides of the issue, however, did not
change from previous decisions.
These cases suggest that, notwithstanding the results, the pro-choice forces
may have actually lost ground in the 1999 Term. First, there was nothing in either
Hill or Stenberg that established any new basis, or strengthened any existing basis,
for a woman's constitutional right to choose. Second, the pro-choice side in both
cases lost the support of Justice Kennedy, who co-authored the majority opinion
in the last abortion case decided by the Supreme Court, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.3' In Hill, by contrast, Justice Kennedy voiced
agreement with Justice Scalia's conclusion that the regulation should be
overturned32 and filed his own dissent, stating in part that "[i]n addition to
undermining established First Amendment principles, the Court's decision
conflicts with the essence of the joint opinion in Casey .... Furthermore, in
Stenberg,34 Justice Kennedy accused the majority of "misunderstanding" Casey by
not giving States sufficient latitude to fashion abortion regulations. Justice
Kennedy wrote in part that:
[w]hen the Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe, a central premise was that
the States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating on the subject of
28. 491 U.S. at 791.
29. 512 U.S. at 772-73.
30. 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In the 1992 5-4 decision, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter were
joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, while in 1999, Justices O'Connor and Souter were joined by
Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg.
32. Justice Scalia's dissent in Hill stated in part:
What is before us ... is a speech regulation directed against the opponents of abortion, and
it therefore enjoys the benefit of the "ad hoe nullification machine" that the Court has set in
motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly
favored practice. Having deprived abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the
electorate that abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues and expands
its assault upon their individual right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what
they are doing is wrong. Because, like the rest of our abortion jurisprudence, today's
decision is in stark contradiction of the constitutional principles we apply in all other
contexts, I dissent.
120 S. Ct. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785).
33. Id. at 2516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
34. 120 S. Ct. at 2623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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abortion, as limited by the woman's right the Court restated and again
guaranteed ... The Court's decision today, in my submission, repudiates this
understanding by invalidating a statute advancing critical state interests, even
though the law denies no woman the right to choose an abortion and places no
undue burden upon the right.35
This indicates that Justice Kennedy may not support any future application of
Casey beyond the specific facts of that case.
Finally, more related to style than substance, Justice Scalia delivered from
the bench a stinging rebuke of the majority opinion, likening Stenberg to
Korematsu36 and Dred Scott,37 two previous Supreme Court decisions.8 Surely,
such open hostility cannot be viewed as evidence of moderation.
C
Finally, in Santa Fe, a 6-3 majority held that Santa Fe's policy of permitting
student-initiated prayer at public high school football games violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 9 The Court concluded that the
state sponsorship of the event and the coerced nature of the participation brought
the facts squarely within established authorities,40 specifically Lee v. Weisman,41
and Wallace v. Jaffree.42 The Court stated that "[i]n Lee v. Weisman, we held that
a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation ceremony violated
35. Id. Justice Kennedy concluded by stating:
Ignoring substantial medical and ethical opinion, the Court substitutes its own judgment for
the judgment of Nebraska and some 30 other States and sweeps the law away. The Court's
holding stems from misunderstanding the record, misinterpretation of Casey, outright refusal
to respect the law of a State, and statutory construction in conflict with settled rules. The
decision nullifies a law expressing the will of the people of Nebraska that medical procedures
must be governed by moral principles having their foundation in the intrinsic value of human
life, including life of the unborn. Through their law the people of Nebraska were forthright
in confronting an issue of immense moral consequence. The State chose to forbid a
procedure many decent and civilized people find so abhorrent as to be among the most
serious of crimes against human life, while the State still protected the woman's autonomous
right of choice as reaffirmed in Casey. The Court closes its eyes to these profound concerns.
I& at 2634-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
37. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
38. 120 S. Ct. at 2621. Justice Scalia went on to include:
Today's decision, that the Constitution of the United States prevents the prohibition of a
horrible mode of abortion, will be greeted by a firestorm of criticism-as well it should. I
cannot understand why those who acknowledge that, in the opening words of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, "[t]he issue of abortion is one of the most contentious and
controversial in contemporary American society," persist in the belief that this Court, armed
with neither constitutional text nor accepted tradition, can resolve that contention and
controversy rather than be consumed by it. If only for the sake of its own preservation, the
Court should return this matter to the people-where the Constitution, by its silence on the
subject, left it-and let them decide, State by State, whether this practice should be allowed.
Casey must be overruled.
Id. at 2622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
39. 120 S. Ct. at 2275.
40. See id.
41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
42. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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that Clause. Although this case involves student prayer at a different type of
school function, our analysis is properly guided by the principles that we endorsed
in Lee.",
41
By contrast, in Mitchell v. Helms,44 announced one week later, a four-justice
plurality moved the Court significantly closer to permitting state support for
religious schools, announcing new principles of law and expressly overruling parts
of two previous opinions, Wolman v. Walter,45 and Meek v. Pittenger,6 which had
struck down similar parochial school assistance programs as impermissible
government aid to religion.47 The opinion of the Court stated that "[i]n
distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of
neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion."4 In her cQncurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
concluded that a program allowing library and computer materials to be supplied
to a parochial school does not have the effect of advancing religion and cannot
"reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of regon.,49
IV
Other cases decided this Term put the Rehnquist Court's distinctive mark on
a number of significant social and political issues.
A
The Court decided two important federalism cases. In United States v.
Morrison,"0 a 5-4 majority held that the portion of the Violence Against Women
Act which creates a private right of action for victims of gender-motivated
violence was not a valid exercise of Congressional power under either the
Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 51 The
Court concluded that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic
activity,5 2 and that the 14th Amendment applies only when states, not individuals,
43. Doe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 577) (citation omitted). The Lee Court held:
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
"establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."
Id (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
44. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality opinion).
45. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
46. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
47. 120 S. Ct. at 2535.
48. Id. at 2532.
49. Id. at 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,235 (1992)).
50. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
51. Id at 1759.
52. See id. at 1754.
2000]
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take discriminatory action.53
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,s4 a 5-4 majority held that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not effectively abrogate states'
11th Amendment immunity because, notwithstanding a clear statement of
Congressional intent,55 the abrogation in this case exceeded Congress's authority
56under the 14th Amendment . The Court held that thel4th Amendment does not
grant Congress the power to apply the ADEA to the states because age is not a
suspect classification. Further, the legislative history of the ADEA suggests that
Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the states.57 The
result in this case was anticipated, based on the Court's previous decisions in
Alden v. Maine58 and College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-Paid Post-Secondary
Education Expenses. 9 The effect will be to solidify Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,60 and City of Boerne v. Flores6' as settled law.
B
The Court also issued important opinions in connection with freedom of
association claims under the First Amendment. In Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,62 a 5-4 majority held that a New Jersey law which prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation would not
require the Boy Scouts to admit an avowed homosexual activist because to do so
would violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association.
The Court reasoned that such required admission would adversely affect the
mission of the Boy Scouts.63
In California Democratic Party v. Jones,64 a 7-2 majority invalidated a
California law mandating a primary election system in which all voters were
permitted to vote for any candidate on the primary ballot, regardless of the voter's
or the candidate's party affiliation. The Court held that the law burdened "a
political party's First Amendment right of association" by forcing association with
non-members and altering parties' candidates and messages.65
C
The Court also made a statement on family values. In Troxel v. Granville,66
53. See id. at 1758.
54. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
55. 1I at 640.
56. Id. at 645.
57. See id. at 649.
58. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
59. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
60. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
61. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
62. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
63. See id at 2454.
64. 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
65. Id. at 2404 (2000).
66. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
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by a 6-3 vote (Justices Souter and Thomas concurring in the judgment), the Court
affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court invalidating a state
statute that did not require the view of the parent to be given particular weight in
a trial court's determination of the best interests of the child. The Court held that
this statute infringed upon the mother's fundamental rights as a parent under the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.67
V
Finally, I would like to mention one case, unrelated to ideology, that
involves an issue of particular concern to federal trial court judges. Since I came
on the federal bench in 1995, approximately one-third of all the civil trials that I
have conducted involved claims under the federal employment laws, including
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. In
the last two years, the Supreme Court has responded to the needs of trial courts by
providing clear guidance for addressing various issues that arise under these
statutes.
The Court decided a very significant case in this area in the 1999 term:
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Product, Inc. s In Reeves, the Court unanimously
held that a prima facie case of discrimination plus sufficient evidence to reject the
employer's proffered explanation for its employment action, without more, may
permit a finding of liability. Specifically, the Court concluded that evidence which
causes the finder of fact to believe that the stated reason for the employment
action at issue is false, is sufficient for a rational jury to find that an employee was
discharged for a reason prohibited by law.6' This case will have a profound effect
on the many employment cases coming before the federal courts.
These are just some of the important cases of the 1999 Term of the Supreme
Court that you will hear about today. Again, I congratulate the University of
Tulsa College of Law for its continued contribution to the study of constitutional
law.
67. See id. at 2060.
68. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
69. See id. at 2109.
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